International Journal of Constitutional Law Advance Access originally published online on March 21, 2008
International Journal of Constitutional Law 2008 6(2):267-286; doi:10.1093/icon/mon004
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The role of dignity in equality law: Lessons from Canada and South Africa
* Lecturer in human rights, Human Rights Centre, School of Law. Queen's University of Belfast. I am grateful to colleagues in the Human Rights Centre, Queen's University of Belfast, and to Fiona O'Connell and participants at the Equality and Social Inclusion conference in Queen's, February 2006, for comments on an earlier draft. Responsibility for any inadequacies is mine alone. Email: r.oconnell{at}qub.ac.uk
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This paper examines the link made on occasion between the concept of dignity and substantive equality; it is further noted that dignity can have very different meanings in different contexts. While the notion of dignity does not often play a substantive role in the resolution of decisions, sometimes the underlying understanding of dignity does matter. However, in all cases, judges should avoid the temptation to rely on unarticulated value judgments or subjective notions of dignity. When judges make reference to dignity, they should articulate the values underpinning their conception of it.